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Television plays a major role in the formation of public opinion in Ukraine. For 85% of the pop-
ulation, it represents their main source of information. By providing information about candi-
dates in an election, their manifestos, and events surrounding election campaigns, television 
stations have a fundamental impact on the popularity of individual politicians and political 
parties, and their prospects of taking up senior posts. Online and press sources play a much 
smaller role in determining public opinion.
Although the authorities in Kyiv have attempted to legislate to reform the media sector from 
2014 onwards, the process of making the envisaged changes has come to a standstill. It has 
proven impossible to eliminate the problems that existed in the media prior to the Maidan 
revolution. The major television stations are still controlled by a small group of the wealthiest 
oligarchs, and are used by these oligarchs as vehicles for furthering their business and politi-
cal agendas. The predominantly privately-owned media are highly dependent on the political 
and business relations between their proprietors and politicians. As a result of these ties, tele-
vision stations under oligarch control have been engaging in measures to support or discredit 
particular candidates in the current presidential election campaign. Due to the importance 
and the part played by the media in shaping public attitudes, their influence over the outcome 
of the presidential election due to be held on 31 March will be considerable.
A change that did not come to pass
Following the Maidan revolution, the expec-
tations of Ukrainians that the situation in the 
country would improve went beyond those re-
lated to social and political changes, measures 
to combat corruption, and integration with 
structures in the West. They also related to re-
form of the media sector to improve freedom 
of speech1. There was a general expectation of 
greater media pluralism and objectivity, which 
has largely been eroded under Viktor Yanuko- 
1 Petro Poroshenko pledged to reform the media sector 
and strengthen the role of the media as a means of rein-
ing in the government in his election manifesto in May 
2014: https://programaporoshenka.com/Programa_Po-
roshenko.pdf
vych’s rule2. The media were supposed to rein 
in the authorities and report faithfully on the 
domestic situation. 
Under pressure from the public, the new gov-
ernment in Kyiv attempted to pass legislation 
in line with these public expectations. As ear-
ly as April 2014, an act was passed to create 
a state-run broadcasting service based on the 
existing nationwide and local television and 
radio stations. This state broadcasting service 
was tasked with creating a medium to make 
2	 T.	Iwański,	‘The	press	and	freedom	of	speech	in	Ukraine	
ahead of parliamentary elections’, OSW Commentary, 
24.09.2012, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2012-09-24/press-and-freedom-
speech-ukraine-ahead-parliamentary-elections
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programmes in the public interest3. In Septem-
ber 2015, parliament passed an act making it 
compulsory for radio and television stations to 
make public their ownership structure in full. 
This was done to guarantee transparency with-
in the media sector and to prevent attempts on 
the part of business and political groups to mo-
nopolise it. In addition, 760 press publications 
that were under state and municipal ownership 
were privatised. 
Despite this progress, the intended reform 
programme has come to a halt. The main me-
dia outlets, among them the top ten television 
stations, which have an audience of more than 
60% of the media sector, are still controlled by 
a handful of the most powerful oligarchs: Ihor 
Kolomoysky, Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, 
Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Viktor Pinchuk (this share 
is even greater when the sport, lifestyle and 
children’s channels are included). By tightly con-
trolling the editorial policy of television stations 
and the press, they support or oppose particular 
leaders and political forces, depending on how 
the relationship stands at the time4. As a result, 
the media, subjected to oligarchical interests, 
are not an adequate outlet for communication 
between the government and the public. Infor-
mation is conveyed selectively and manipulated.
Although the oligarch-controlled television 
stations are not the oligarchs’ most important 
business assets, they serve as a form of politi-
cal investment. In most cases, due to enormous 
financial	outlays,	these	media,	which	are	com-
3	 ‘Про	Суспільне	телебачення	і	радіомовлення	України’, 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1227-18
4	 Д.	 Дуцик,	А.	Мніх,	П.	Бурковський,	 ‘Основні	 тенден-
ції	 медіависвітлення	 суспільно-політичних	 процесів	
в	Україні	 у	2014-2017	рр.’,	Kyiv	2017,	p.	7–17,	https://
ms.detector.media/content/files/dm_news_2014-17_in-
ternet.compressed.pdf
parable to (or even exceeding) their Western 
counterparts in terms of technology, do not 
generate revenue. Due to support from specif-
ic political forces, however, the owners of the 
largest media concerns can balance the invest-
ment	outlays	with	measurable	benefits	for	their	
business operations in the form of legislation or 
political decisions favourable to their business. 
These ties mean that the owners use their tel-
evision stations to further short-term interests 
at the expense of credible reporting. As a result 
of this dependence, the value of television sta-
tions is determined not only according to their 
position in the media sector, but also according 
to their ability to shape the image of politicians 
and political parties. 
The political and business climate in which the 
mass media operate has led to various kinds 
of breaches of media freedom and journalis-
tic standards. To achieve political and business 
goals, the owners of the largest media con-
cerns keep the journalists working for them 
in line using a range of measures, including 
proprietor	 censorship	 in	 the	 form	 of	 financial	
or administrative penalties. It is common for 
politicians to order and pay for material that 
presents a particular person or event in a spe-
cific	light	( jeansa). As the presidential election 
draws near, this pathological situation in the 
media sector is worsening, causing the amount 
of paid material aimed at promoting particu-
lar politicians (parket) or discrediting them 
(chornukha) to increase.
Stars of television stations
More than 85% of the population of Ukraine 
say	that	they	find	out	about	the	domestic	situa-
tion and the world at large from television news 
programmes5. The role that television plays in 
forming the views of the public is also demon-
5 Протидія російській пропаганді та медіаграмотність: 
результати всеукраїнського опитування громадської 
думки. Аналітичний звіт,	 Детектор	медіа,	 Kyiv	 2018, 
p. 10, https://detector.media/doc/images/news/archive/ 
2016/136017/DM_KMIS_ukr__WEB-2.pdf
The media in Ukraine are highly depend-
ent on the political and business relations 
between their proprietors and politicians. 
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strated by the high level of trust in the credibility 
of the information provided (61% of Ukrainians 
consider the output of nationwide television 
stations to be credible6) and the role it plays 
in moulding the public’s image of politicians 
(70% of respondents obtain information about 
election manifestos from television stations7).
The television station with the highest viewing 
figures	 is	 Ukraina,	 which	 is	 controlled	 by	 the	
wealthiest Ukrainian, Rinat Akhmetov (15.26% 
of airtime in 2018)8.	Ukraina	is	also	in	first	place	
in terms of the volume of material that violates 
journalistic standards for current affairs re-
porting. It was responsible for almost 40% of 
all biased and unreliable material broadcast on 
Ukrainian television in 2018)9. The person most 
featured in hidden advertising is Oleh Lyashko, 
leader of the Radical Party, which the oligarch 
finances.	 In	 return,	 Radical	 Party	MPs	 vote	 in	
parliament in line with his interests (particular-
ly in relation to legislation concerning mining 
and metals, which is the same sphere in which 
Akhmetov’s Metinwest Group operates10). 
Lyashko is regularly featured as a guest on 
news programmes commenting on current af-
fairs, and as a guest on programmes about so-
cial and commercial issues as well.
Another person who frequently appears on 
Ukraina is Oleksandr Vilkul, who is running 
6	 ‘Ставлення	населення	до	ЗМІ	та	споживання	різних	ти-
пів	ЗМІ	у	2018	року’,	Internews,	Kyiv	2018,	p.	5,	https://in-
ternews.in.ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2018-MCS_
FULL_UKR.pdf
7	 ‘В	очікуванні	президентських	виборів:	настрої	укра-
їнців,	 Рейтинг’,	 26.06.2018,	 http://ratinggroup.ua/
research/ukraine/v_ozhidanii_prezidentskih_vyborov_
nastroeniya_ukraincev.html
8	 ‘«Україна»	стала	лідером	телеперегляду	у	2018	році,	
друге	 місце	 –	 в	 «1+1»,	 ICTV	 та	 «Інтера»’,	 Детектор	
медіа,	 8.01.2019,	 https://detector.media/rinok/arti-
cle/143867/2019-01-08-ukraina-stala-liderom-telepere-
glyadu-u-2018-rotsi-druge-mistse-v-11-ictv-ta-intera/
9	 З.	 Красовська,	 ‘Кого	найбільше	піарили	в	 теленови-
нах	 2018	 року’,	 25.01.2019,	 Детектор	 медіа, https://
ms.detector.media/monitoring/daily_news/kogo_
naybilshe_piarili_v_telenovinakh_2018_roku/
10	А.	 Кривко,	 ‘Депутати	 за	 викликом.	 Як	 “радикали”	
Ляшка	 Ахметову	 допомагають’, Українська правда, 
24.05.2018, https://vybory.pravda.com.ua/files/graph/
deputaty_za_vyklykom/
for president as a member of the Opposition 
Bloc that is also supported by the oligarch. 
An analysis of the content of news broadcasts 
on Akhmetov’s station shows that President 
Petro Poroshenko is presented neutrally (58.8% 
of cases) or favourably (41.2%)11. The sym-
pathy that the oligarch has for the president, 
who is seeking re-election, takes the form of 
a series of exclusive interviews with Poroshen-
ko, conducted since the beginning of the year 
(in the past, the president’s wife was a present-
er of the station’s morning gymnastics show). 
The favourable stance of Akhmetov’s media is 
provided in return for the president’s adminis-
tration assenting to the businessmen’s increas-
ing	 influence,	 among	other	 things,	 in	 the	 en-
ergy sector12. Providing media backing for as 
many as three presidential candidates is a form 
of investment for the oligarch, for whom this 
is	a	means	of	expanding	his	political	influence.
The	second	most	popular	station	is	1+1	(10,05%	
of	the	market),	owned	by	Ihor	Kolomoysky	(2+2	
and TET are also among the oligarch’s top sta-
tions). This station devotes an unusual amount 
of airtime to popular comedian Volodymyr 
Zelenskiy, who announced at the end of 2018 
that he would be running in the presidential 
election, and currently leads in the election 
11	 В.	Кондратова,	‘Говорит	и	показывает	кандидат.	Кому	
помогают	 телеканалы	олигархов’,	ЛІГА.net,	 7.12.2018,	
https://www.liga.net/politics/articles/govorit-i-pokazy-
vaet-kandidat-komu-pomogayut-telekanaly-oligarhov
12	 Introduction	 of	 the	 Rotterdam+	 formula	 when	 calcu-
lating the price of coal purchased by the state from 
the	 oligarch’s	 companies	 significantly	 increased	 their	
revenue,	 see	 T.	 Iwański,	 ‘Prywatyzacja	 po	 ukraińsku:	
Achmetow	 umacnia	 się	 w	 energetyce’,	 Analizy OSW, 
6.09.2017, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/anal-
izy/2017-09-06/prywatyzacja-po-ukrainsku-achme-
tow-umacnia-sie-w-energetyce
Television plays a major role in the forma-
tion of public opinion in Ukraine and is the 
main source of information for the public.
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polls13. Zelenskiy appears not only in the week-
ly	 comedy	 show	 “95	 Quarter”	 and	 the	 series	
“Servant	of	the	People”,	in	which	he	plays	the	
lead role, but also in a reality show that tracks 
how his election campaign is proceeding. 
A large portion of his satirical performanc-
es, and the news broadcasts, clearly adopt 
a negative tone towards President Poroshenko. 
The extremely negative image of the Ukrain-
ian	 head	 of	 state	 portrayed	 on	 1+1	 is	 due	 to 
a	severe	conflict	between	President	Poroshenko	
and the station’s owner.
In third place in terms of airtime is Inter (9.12% 
of the market), which is owned by oligarchs 
Dmytro Firtash and Serhiy Lyovochkin (NTN 
and	Enter-Film	also	have	high	viewing	figures),	
who hail from the camp of former President 
Viktor Yanukovych. This station is not far be-
hind Ukraina with regard to the amount of hid-
den advertising (38% of all broadcasts of this 
type in 2018). The undisputed star of the Inter 
news bulletins is the long-term business and 
political partner of the outlet’s owners, Yuriy 
Boyko.	Both	the	Opposition	Platform	–	For	Live	
presidential candidate, and the station that pro-
motes him, are associated with a pro-Russian 
and anti-Western stance (in August 2018 the 
National	Television	and	Radio	Council	fined	the	
station for propagating Russian propaganda). 
Inter is another station that does not describe 
Poroshenko’s actions in a particularly critical 
light, leading to speculation that an agreement 
has been reached to exonerate Yuriy Boyko in 
a case concerning fraudulently obtaining state 
funds to purchase drilling rigs in 2011.
In	fourth,	fifth,	and	sixth	place	in	terms	of	pop-
ularity are the television stations owned by 
Viktor Pinchuk and his wife Olena: ICTV (7.89% 
market share), STB (7.05% market share) and 
Novy Kanal (4.45% market share). Unlike the 
other oligarch-owned stations, Pinchuk’s sta-
13	K.	Nieczypor,	‘Od	“sługi	narodu”	do	trybuna	ludowego?	
Wołodymyr	Zełenski	w	wyborach	na	prezydenta	Ukrainy’, 
Nowa Europa Wschodnia, 24.01.2019, http://new.org.pl/ 
5933-od-slugi-narodu-do-trybuna-ludowego-wolody-
myr-zelenski-w-wyborach-na-prezydenta-ukrainy
tions present the most objective and evenly 
balanced picture of political affairs in the coun-
try, and are not biased towards any of the can-
didates in the presidential race. This approach 
corresponds to the oligarch himself, who tries 
to stay out of the limelight when it comes to 
current affairs, and avoids being associated 
with any political grouping, concentrating on 
trouble-free relationships with the other actors 
on the political and business scene in Ukraine.
Other stations whose activities are dictated by 
the political activities of their proprietors have 
much	less	reach	and	significance	in	the	media	
sector. Two of these stand out in particular: 112 
(viewership share of approximately 1.5%) and 
NewsOne (share of approximately 0.7%), which 
have been owned for just a few months by 
Taras Kozak, a close partner of Viktor Medved-
chuk and one of the main lobbyists for Russian 
interests in Ukraine. Some programmes broad-
cast by these stations prompted parliament to 
adopt a resolution calling upon the National 
Security and Defence Council to impose penal-
ties for promulgating pro-Russian propaganda. 
Channel 24, owned by the wife of presiden-
tial candidate Andriy Sadovyi, and Channel 5, 
which is under the control of Petro Poroshenko, 
are less controversial. Both of these stations are 
“faithful”	 to	 their	 principals,	 promoting	 their	
candidature and manifestos.
Further down in the rankings of TV station 
popularity, with just 0.5% of airtime, is the 
only state-run television channel, UA: Pershyi. 
The importance of this station among viewers 
is symbolic of the state of reform of the state 
media in Ukraine. The founding in 2014 of 
a joint-stock company on the basis of the state 
broadcaster at the time was intended to repre-
Support given in the media to presidential 
candidates represents a form of invest-
ment for oligarchs, who use it to try to in-
crease their political influence.
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sent a transformation of the state-run nation-
wide and local television and radio stations into 
state-run media, whose mission was to report 
on the country’s political, social, and cultural 
affairs accurately and objectively. This outlet, 
funded by the state but at the same time inde-
pendent of the political climate, was not well 
received by politicians. Despite a main television 
station and local versions of the station being 
launched, decision-makers did not provide even 
half of the funds designated for the broadcast-
er, rendering its activities highly circumscribed. 
Ultimately, the supervisory board dismissed the 
company’s director, Zurab Alasania, at the end 
of January 2019. Some of the journalist com-
munity consider the dismissal of this valued 
journalist and manager to be linked to the on-
going election campaign and the station’s in-
dependent editorial policy under his direction. 
Despite the station not having extensive reach, 
the investigative journalism programmes creat-
ed by its team, on the subject of corruption at 
the highest levels of government, turned out to 
be very popular online, which must have dis-
pleased	many	high-ranking	officials.
The fate of the station Hromadske is also not 
unusual. This station, launched on the day be-
fore the beginning of the Maidan revolution, 
was an example of a grass-roots social initiative 
inspiring hope for a new level of quality in the 
media.	Meanwhile,	 internal	 conflicts	 and	 reli-
ance on external funding in the form of interna-
tional grants caused the outlet to become mar-
ginalised on the media scene. Other projects of 
this kind met a similar fate, such as Espreso.tv, 
created by politician and journalist Mykola 
Kniazhytsky, and, for example, Spilno.tv, 
which no longer exists and was operated by 
Maidan activists. 
TV for which there is no alternative 
The online media and the press play a much 
smaller role in forming the public mood than 
television stations. Only 27.1% of Ukrainians 
say that they get their news from online media, 
while 8.1% say that they obtain it from news-
papers and magazines. At the same time, the 
number of people using online sources is in-
creasing, and the number of people consulting 
the press is waning (subscriptions to newspa-
pers have gone down by as much as 27% over 
the last three years)14.
Betrayal of journalistic standards and ethics 
in the online media and press is also a seri-
ous problem. Experts at the Kyiv Mass Infor-
mation Institute say that the amount of po-
litical advertising ordered and paid for in the 
form of articles published online in September 
2018	 reached	 the	 highest	 level	 for	 five	 years. 
The largest amount of this material was found 
on the websites UNIAN (owned by Ihor Kolo-
moysky) and Obozrewatel (registered to the 
sons of Mikhailo Brodsky, a former business 
partner of Ihor Kolomoysky).
Over the last two years, texts published online 
and in the press that were ordered and paid for 
concerned the Ukraine Orthodox Church-Mos-
cow Patriarchate (an average of 9.7 texts pro-
duced to order per week), the Opposition Bloc 
and the Revival Party (7.7), the Radical Party and 
its leader Oleh Lyashko (5.5), Yulia Tymoshenko 
and Vadym Rabinovych (3.8 each), and 
Viktor Medvedchuk (3.1). The most trustworthy 
and accurate online sources were found to be 
“Ukrayinska	Pravda,	“Ukrinform”	and	“Liga”15.
14	 ‘За	три	роки	передплата	газет	і	журналів	скоротила-
ся	майже	на	третину’, Укрінформ,	7.08.2019,	https://
www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/2512974-za-tri-
roki-peredplata-gazet-i-zurnaliv-skorotilasa-majze-na-
tretinu.html
15	 ‘Саморегуляція	 та	 журналістські	 стандарти	 під	 час	
виборчих	 кампаній’,	 Укрінформ,	 17.09.2018,	https://
www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-presshall/2532146-samoreg-
ulacia-ta-zurnalistski-standarti-pid-cas-viborcih-kam-
panij.html
The online media and press play a much 
smaller role in shaping public opinion than 
TV stations.
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Closed arrangement
The	 specific	manner	 in	 which	 television	 func-
tions in Ukraine is a result of the oligarchical 
system, which has not changed fundamentally 
in spite of Maidan revolution. The politicisation 
of the Ukrainian media, the breaches of jour-
nalistic standards, and the increasing amount 
of hidden advertising is due to media capital 
being concentrated in the hands of the busi-
ness elite. For this elite, TV stations are not any 
ordinary business, but a means of achieving 
political ends. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that for many years Ukraine has come below 
100th place in the ranking of countries accord-
ing to freedom of the press, and by the slow 
rate of progress in addressing this problem 
(an improvement from 126th place in 2013 
to 101st place in 2018)16.
By manipulating the public, skirting over sub-
jects that are troublesome for the politicians 
being supported, and launching campaigns to 
discredit people who are bothersome and pro-
tected by oligarchs, the media have a substan-
tial	 influence	over	the	popularity	of	politicians	
and political parties, and upon public opinion. 
16 2018 World Press Freedom Index, Reporters without 
Borders, https://rsf.org/en/ukraine
The success of election campaigns of particular 
politicians depends on the support they are giv-
en by the most popular media outlets owned 
by the oligarchs. 
As the media market becomes more rigid, ac-
tivists and politicians who are not part of the 
political and business establishment become 
marginalised in public debate and cannot ef-
fectively convey their message to the public 
without	 the	 appropriate	 financial	 and	 media	
backing. This prevents lesser known politicians 
and politicians who are not connected with the 
narrow political and business elite in Ukraine 
from taking part in the political process. 
The fact that communication is dominated by 
a media owned by the wealthiest and most 
powerful	 people	 in	 the	 country	 significantly	
limits political pluralism. As a result, the televi-
sion market is structured in a way that greatly 
obstructs democratisation of the country and 
the carrying out of reform.
The specific manner in which television 
functions in Ukraine is a result of the en-
trenched nature of the oligarchical system.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 295 7
EDITORS: Adam Eberhardt
Anna Łabuszewska, Katarzyna Kazimierska 
TRANSLATION: Jon Tappenden
CO-OPERATION: Timothy Harrell
DTP: Wojciech Mańkowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
0
5
10
15
20
15.26
10.05
9.12
7.89
7.05
4.45 3.96 3.75
2.69
1.71
1+1 2+2 TETUkraina Inter NTN Enter-FilmNovy KanalSTBICTV
APPENDIX
Rinat Akhmetov
(Ukraina) – 15.26%
Ihor Kolomoysky
(1+1, 2+2, TET) – 16.94%
Dmytro Firtash, Serhiy Lvovochkin
(Inter, NTN, Enter-Film) – 14.79%
Viktor Pinchuk
(ICTV, STB, Novy Kanal) – 13.39%
Other – 39.62%
1. Share in total audience figures of the top ten television stations in Ukraine 
owned by particular oligarchs
2. Share in total audience figures for the top ten television stations in Ukraine in 2018
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